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Claims that an arbitral tribunal failed to deal with an issue: the setting aside of awards 
under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration 
Jonathan Hill1 
 
ABSTRACT 
After an award has been rendered, one of the parties may seek to challenge it on the basis 
that the tribunal failed to address an important question which was raised in the arbitration. 
The Arbitration Act 1996 (‘AA96’) provides for the setting aside (or remission) of an award if 
the tribunal failed to deal with an issue that was put to it (s 68(2)(d)). Although there is no 
equivalent provision in article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (‘Model Law’), there are cases 
decided in several Model Law jurisdictions which show that the courts of these countries are 
no less willing than the English courts to set aside (or remit) an award if the tribunal failed to 
deal with an important issue. In policy terms, such cases – which fall perilously close to the 
dividing line between the merits, on the one hand, and the arbitral procedure, on the other 
– raise questions over the extent to which supervisory courts should allow themselves to be 
drawn into second-guessing the merits of the parties’ dispute. At a more technical level, 
there are two issues which merit close examination: first, which paragraph of article 34 of 
the Model Law (if any) provides the legal basis for the court’s power to set aside in cases of 
arbitral omission; secondly, if article 34 does authorise setting aside in these cases, to what 
extent does the process of reasoning of the courts of Model Law jurisdictions run in parallel 
with that of the English courts under the AA96. Ultimately, is it possible to say that, in this 
area, the AA96 provides a preferable solution to that of the Model Law (or vice versa)?  
 
I Introduction  
Back in the 1980s, the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law recommended 
against England adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(‘Model Law’). Although the Arbitration Act 1996 (‘AA96’) was drafted with close regard to 
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the Model Law, whose impact can clearly be seen in terms of the AA96’s structure, style and 
content, the decision was taken that English arbitration law should retain a number of 
distinctive features; even in those areas in which the objectives of the AA96 broadly mirror 
those of the Model Law, there are places where the two legislative schemes diverge.  
 
One significant area of difference involves the setting aside of awards. On this question, the 
Model Law is, at first glance, simplicity itself. The six grounds for setting aside under article 
34 are ‘essentially the same reasons as those on which recognition or enforcement may be 
refused under … article V of the 1958 New York Convention on which [article 34] is closely 
modelled.’2 The AA96, however, approaches setting aside in a different way. There are five 
significant points of contrast. 
 
First, in keeping with the traditions of English arbitration law, section 69 of the AA96 
provides that, albeit in carefully circumscribed and narrow circumstances, an award may be 
set aside if, as regards the merits of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal made an error of 
English law. The Model Law, by contrast, follows the modern international practice of 
making no provision for setting aside because the tribunal did not reach the correct result, 
on either the facts or the law.  
 
Secondly, the AA96 separates ‘jurisdictional’ defects from ‘procedural’ and other defects: 
the former fall within section 67; the latter are covered by section 68. Under the Model Law, 
by contrast, there is no systematic division: jurisdictional defects are addressed by article 
34.2.a.i (invalid arbitration agreement) and article 34.2.a.iii (excess of jurisdiction); 
procedural problems are covered by article 34.2.a.ii (due process) and article 34.2.a.iv 
(incorrect arbitral procedure);3 public policy (including non-arbitrability) falls within article 
34.2.b.  
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Thirdly, section 68(2) lists a total of twelve procedural grounds (‘serious irregularities’) on 
which an award may be set aside or remitted. This list contrasts, as has just been seen, with 
the Model Law’s two procedural grounds. Of course, there is considerable overlap between 
elements of sections 68(2) and of article 34 of the Model Law; for example, section 68(2)(c) 
(‘failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure 
agreed by the parties’) mirrors part of article 34.2.a.iv and section 68(2)(a) (‘failure by the 
tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal [to act fairly and impartially as 
between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and 
dealing with that of his opponent])’) broadly matches article 34.2.a.ii which allows for an 
award to be set aside if the applicant was ‘unable to present his case’. However, section 
68(2) is more detailed than article 34 and the English legislation contains grounds for setting 
aside which have no direct counterpart in the Model Law, such as section 68(2)(f) 
(‘uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award’) and section 68(2)(h) (‘failure to 
comply with the requirements as to the form of the award’).  
 
Fourthly, it is expressly provided that an award cannot be set aside on one of the grounds in 
section 68(2) unless the irregularity relied on by the applicant has caused or will cause 
‘substantial injustice’ to the applicant. In purely textual terms there is no counterpart to this 
aspect of section 68 in article 34.4 
 
Fifthly, section 68(3) provides that, if a serious irregularity is established, the supervisory 
court has a choice between three options: remitting the award to the tribunal for 
reconsideration, setting aside the award or declaring the award to be of no effect. By 
contrast, article 34 provides simply that an award ‘may’ be set aside if one of the grounds is 
established, thereby giving the supervisory court a degree of flexibility without stipulating 
how that flexibility should operate.  
 
The combined effect of these differences is to produce setting-aside regimes which, 
although largely seeking to implement the same policies, are structured in rather different 
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ways. This point can be illustrated by the relatively common situation where, after an award 
has been rendered, one of the parties (typically, a respondent whose defence was wholly or 
partially unsuccessful) challenges the award on the basis that the tribunal failed to consider 
an important question which was raised in the arbitration.  
 
The AA96 includes a specific ground for setting aside which addresses this type of case; 
section 68(2)(d) provides for an award to be set aside or remitted if the tribunal ‘failed to 
deal with all the issues that were put to it’. This is another of the grounds in section 68(2) 
which has no direct counterpart in the Model Law. If one assumes that, in policy terms, the 
courts of Model Law jurisdictions are no less concerned than the English courts about the 
potential injustice flowing from an arbitral tribunal’s failure to deal with an issue presented 
in the arbitration, the following question arises: how are the types of case which fall within 
section 68(2)(d) AA96 to be dealt with under article 34 of the Model Law? This question can 
be answered at two different levels. First, if the courts of Model Law jurisdictions are willing 
to set aside or remit awards in cases where the tribunal failed to deal with all the issues, 
what is the relevant legal basis under article 34? Secondly, to what extent do the decisions 
of the courts of Model Law jurisdictions mirror those of the English courts in terms of their 
process of reasoning and to what extent, if at all, are the English authorities influential in 
such cases?  
 
The analysis which follows seeks to answer these two questions (Sections III and IV). 
However, the discussion starts by examining the nature of arbitral omissions and where, 
within a typology of omissions, a failure ’to deal with an issue’ can be located (Section II). 
Finally, the discussion finishes with a conclusion which seeks to draw together the threads 
of the preceding sections (Section V).  
 
II Arbitral omissions  
When a party to an arbitration seeks to challenge an arbitral award on the ground that it 
failed to address a claim or an issue or an argument or a piece of evidence, the law could, in 
broad terms, adopt one of three positions along a spectrum. First, at one end of the 
spectrum, one might say that, having rendered its award, the tribunal has effectively dealt 
with all the claims, issues, arguments and evidence. In a case in which the claimant 
  
advances two distinct claims, if the tribunal awards damages for the first claim, but does not 
refer to the other one, it might be thought that the tribunal implicitly rejected the second 
claim. Similarly, according to this approach, an award which decides that the respondent 
was in breach of contract must (logically) have rejected all of the respondent’s defences 
even if none of the defences is explicitly considered by the award. The same analysis could 
be applied to all the arguments, submissions and evidence presented to the tribunal; the 
award refers to those matters which the tribunal considered to be most relevant and 
anything omitted from the award was either rejected or deemed unimportant. According to 
this approach, there is no such thing as an arbitral omission.  
 
This approach does have attractions and there are some cases in which one of the parties 
has sought (unsuccessfully) to press an argument along these lines.5 If arbitration is to be 
seen as an autonomous method of dispute resolution outside the courts, it is for the 
tribunal to decide what is relevant or irrelevant and how to present its findings and 
conclusions in the award. However, the argument that the notion of an arbitral omission is 
an illusion cannot be supported. If an arbitral award fails to address either expressly or 
impliedly an important matter presented during in the arbitration, it is a not unreasonable 
inference that the tribunal might have overlooked it or, at any rate, failed to accord it 
sufficient significance.  
 
If an award is challenged on the basis of such an omission, the response might be that the 
tribunal did, in fact, deal with the issue, but failed to state its reasons for doing so. But, 
whether the alleged omission is characterised as an omission of substance (failure to deal 
with an issue) or a defect in terms of reasoning or communication (failure to provide 
reasons for the decision), the disappointed party has a legitimate complaint. Unless they 
have dispensed with the requirement for reasons, the parties to the arbitration are entitled 
to be told why the tribunal accepted or rejected their respective cases. From the parties’ 
point of view, it makes little difference whether the tribunal overlooked a particular matter 
or whether it decided the matter in question, but failed to communicate its decision and/or 
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the reasons for it. As the judge said in Buyuk Camlica Shipping Trading & Industry Co Inc v 
Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd:  
It is not sufficient for an arbitral tribunal to deal with crucial issues in pectore, such 
that the parties are left to guess at whether a crucial issue has been dealt with or has 
been overlooked.6  
 
Institutional arbitration rules and national arbitration legislation accept that, if claims are 
submitted to arbitration, an award which fails to deal with all those claims is defective; an 
award which fails to deal with one (or more) of the claims presented to the tribunal, 
whether formally by way of pleadings or otherwise,7 is referred to as infra petita. Whether 
or not an award is infra petita depends on its proper interpretation: the fact that an award 
does not expressly address a particular claim does not necessarily mean that the tribunal 
failed to deal with it; it may, for example, be appropriate to conclude from the award as a 
whole that the tribunal impliedly rejected the claim in question.8 But, it follows logically 
from recognition of the concept of an infra petita award that it is not legitimate simply to 
decide that any claim advanced in the arbitration that is not addressed in the award was 
necessarily rejected by the tribunal.  
 
Where the tribunal fails to decide a claim or counterclaim submitted to arbitration the party 
disadvantaged by that omission should, in principle, apply to the arbitrator again.9 If a claim 
has been omitted from the award, arbitration rules10 and legislation11 provide that, in 
response to an application by one of the parties, the tribunal may render an additional 
                                                          
6 [2010] EWHC 442 (Comm) at [38]. 
7 As regards the presentation of claims, no particular formality is required. In the words of Hamblen J in 
Cadogan Maritime Inc v Turner Shipping Inc [2013] EWHC 138 (Comm) at [22]): ‘it does not matter how the 
claim has been placed before the tribunal. It does not, for example, have to be a claim set out in written 
pleadings or submissions.’ While claims are generally advanced by the parties, a claim may be presented by 
operation of statute: Casata Ltd v General Distributors Ltd [2006] NZSC 6 (in which, in the context of an 
arbitration seated in New Zealand, an arbitral tribunal was entitled to render an additional award in relation to 
costs, by virtue of cl 6 of the Second Schedule to the Arbitration Act 1996 (NZ), even though no party had 
claimed costs).  
8 Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014) p 3149. 
9 Savage & Gaillard (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (1999) para 
1628. 
10 See, eg, art 48 CIETAC Arbitration Rules; art 39 HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules; art 27 LCIA Arbitration 
Rules; art 29 SIAC Arbitration Rules; art 39 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.  
11 AA96, s 57(3)b); art 33.3 of the Model Law.  
  
award.12 The value of such provisions is that they ‘enable[…] the arbitral process to correct 
itself, rather than requiring applications to the Court.’13 The power of an arbitral tribunal to 
render an additional award is limited to cases where the award rendered by the tribunal 
omits ‘any claim’ 14 or ‘claims’;15 it does not extend to situations where the alleged omission 
was a failure to deal with something less than a claim, such as an issue or an argument.16  
 
Building on the idea that an arbitral tribunal’s failure to deal with a claim is a defect which 
requires a remedy, the law could adopt a position at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
the first: an award might be treated as defective if it fails to deal with any claim, issue, 
argument or evidence presented by the parties. According to this approach, an aggrieved 
party would be able to challenge an award in any case in which the tribunal failed to deal 
systematically with the totality of the case advanced by each party to the arbitration.  
 
While such an approach might appeal to a disappointed party who feels that it lost in the 
arbitration because the award failed to give due weight to its arguments, submissions and 
evidence, it would involve an unacceptable level of judicial interference with the arbitral 
process. If, for example, an award could be set aside or remitted in the situation where the 
arbitral tribunal failed to consider the submissions or evidence of one of the parties, the 
supervisory court would inevitably be drawn into second-guessing the tribunal’s decisions 
on questions of law and fact, thereby completely undermining the tribunal’s independence. 
Accordingly, it is universally acknowledged that arbitrators are ‘not required to address 
every factual or legal allegation submitted by the parties, let alone every argument put 
forward’;17 no modern system of arbitration law goes so far as accepting that any arbitral 
omission – in terms of claims, issues, submissions, arguments or evidence – may justify the 
court’s intervention.  
                                                          
12 Under s 57(3)(b) AA96, the tribunal may also act ‘on its own initiative’. See Union Marine Classification v 
Government of the Union of Comoros [2015] EWHC 508 (Comm); permission to appeal was refused: [2016] 
EWCA Civ 239. 
13 DAC, Report on the Arbitration Bill (1996) para 261.  
14 AA96, s 57. 
15 Art 33.3 of the Model Law. 
16 See Phang JA in BLC v BLB [2014] SGCA 40 at [108], rejecting the view of the judge at first instance on this 
point: BLB v BLC [2013] SGHC 196.  
17 Savage & Gaillard (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard & Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (1999) para 
1630. 
  
 
The third approach falls between the other two. It recognises that, both in terms of theory 
and practice, an arbitral tribunal may fail to deal with all the matters that were submitted to 
it, an irregularity for which the aggrieved party may be entitled to a remedy. At the same 
time, however, it seeks to uphold, as far as possible, the autonomy of the arbitral process. 
Within this third approach, a dividing line has to be drawn between matters which the 
award must address – and which, if not addressed, may lead to setting aside or remission of 
the award – and other matters. In the context of the AA96, the location of this dividing line 
depends on how the courts interpret the word ‘issues’ in the phrase ‘failure by the tribunal 
to deal with all the issues that were put to it’. If the tribunal fails to deal with an ’issue’, the 
award may be set aside or remitted; if, however, the tribunal fails to deal with matters that 
fall short of being ‘issues’, section 68(2)(d) is not engaged.18  
 
III Failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues: legal bases  
As noted in the introduction, whereas section 68(2)(d) AA96 expressly provides that an 
award may be set aside or remitted if the tribunal failed ‘to deal with all the issues that 
were put to it’, there is no equivalent provision in the Model Law. This does not mean, of 
course, that disappointed parties do not seek to overturn awards rendered in Model Law 
jurisdictions on procedural grounds in cases where the tribunal allegedly failed to deal with 
all the issues. The question, though, is this: how, if at all, do the sorts of challenge which fall 
within section 68(2)(d) AA96 fit within article 34 of the Model Law? The cases decided in 
Model Law jurisdictions such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and Canada suggest five 
possible solutions: the fact that an award fails to deal with an issue is a not a ground for 
setting aside under the Model Law [a]; an award which fails to deal with an issue may be set 
aside or remitted under article 34.2.a.iii (excess of jurisdiction) [b], or under article 34.2.a.ii 
(due process) [c], or under article 34.2.b.ii (public policy) [d], or under article 34.2.a.iv 
(incorrect procedure) [e]. As will be seen, none of these solutions is completely without its 
problems. 
 
                                                          
18 The dividing line between issues, on the one hand, and other matters, on the other, is considered further in 
Section IV[a], below.  
  
It should be noted that there is some overlap between the various provisions of article 34. In 
particular, inability to present one's case (article 34.2.a.ii) is one aspect of natural justice 
which, in most legal systems, is regarded as forming part of public policy (article 34.2.b.ii). 
As will be seen below, other overlaps are also possible. Accordingly, when an application for 
setting aside is based on the contention that the arbitral procedure was defective, there are 
circumstances in which the applicant may seek to rely on more than one provision of article 
34.19 Having said that, the fundamental role of article 34 is to protect the procedural rights 
of the parties to the arbitration by providing a remedy in cases where the arbitration was 
not conducted fairly. As the overriding concern is fairness,20 the classification of an alleged 
irregularity is a secondary issue: ‘[w]hatever label is placed on the procedural error, and 
whichever subsection of article 34(2) is invoked, the essential question remains the same.’21 
The requirements that the applicant must satisfy – as opposed to the legal basis on which an 
application for setting aside or remission may be founded – are considered in Section IV.  
 
[a] No basis for setting aside infra petita awards under the Model Law 
The arbitral tribunal is exclusively competent to determine the merits of the dispute 
referred to arbitration. In the context of the Model Law, the authorities are unambiguous. 
For example, in CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK,22 a 
decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal, VK Rajah JA stated the relevant principle in the 
following absolute terms: ‘[I]t is trite that mere errors of law or even fact are not sufficient 
to warrant setting aside an arbitral award.’23  
 
It might be argued that, although the Model Law makes provision for the rendering of an 
additional award if the tribunal fails to deal with a claim that was submitted to it,24 this is 
the only type of arbitral omission for which the Model Law provides a remedy; as long as the 
                                                          
19 See Lax J in Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones SA de CV v STET International SpA [1999] 45 OR (3d) 
183 at [33].  
20 See VK Rajah JA in Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] SGCA 28 at [65](a). 
21 Doherty JA in Popack v Lipszyc 2016 ONCA 135 at [45]. 
22 [2011] SGCA 3.  
23 At [33]. Judicial statements in Model Law countries to the same (or a similar) effect are legion: see, eg, 
Phang JA in BLC v BLB [2014] SGCA 40 at [53]; Tang VP in Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd 
[2011] HKCA 136 at [7]; Feldman JA in Mexican United States v Cargill Inc 2011 ONCA 622 at [31] and [74]; 
Fraiberg JSC in Canadian Royalties Inc c Nearctic Nickel Mines Inc 2010 QCCS 4600 at [55].  
24 Art 33.3. 
  
tribunal determines all of the claims, it has completed its mandate and no recourse to the 
supervisory court is available to a party which asserts that the tribunal omitted to address 
matters that were presented to it.  
 
In the Hong Kong case of Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corporation v Shanghai Zhonglu 
Industrial Co Ltd25 an award was challenged on the basis, inter alia, that the tribunal had 
failed to consider an issue raised by the respondent as part of its defence. This challenge 
was rejected by Lam J in the following terms:  
 Failure to consider an issue is [a] matter that goes to the substantive decision rather 
than a failure to follow the arbitral procedure agreed by the parties. Thus, the fact 
that the Tribunal failed to consider the Respondent’s case properly is at most an 
error of law which cannot be a basis for this court to set aside the award.26 
 
In a similar vein, Canadian courts (also operating under the Model Law) have drawn 
attention to the differences between the setting aside regimes established by the AA96, on 
the one hand, and the Model Law, on the other. In Consolidated Contractors Group SAL v 
Ambatovy Minerals SA,27 an Ontario judge noted that the ground for setting aside based on 
a failure to deal with an issue is ‘not available under the Model Law’.28 Also, in the 
Australian case of Blanalko Pty Ltd v Lysght Building Solutions Pty Ltd,29 Croft J, having 
referred to the differences between the AA96 and the Model Law, stated:  
the failure of an arbitrator to decide a matter falling within the submission to 
arbitration is, without more, not a ground on which an award will be set aside.30  
 
The counter-argument is that, if an arbitral tribunal fails to engage with the arguments 
presented by one of the parties in support of its case, the arbitral process falls short of the 
standard of fairness and due process that the parties are entitled to expect. Although there 
is always a danger that, in the absence of a means of appeal on the merits, a disappointed 
claimant or respondent will seek to invoke the setting-aside procedure even though their 
                                                          
25 [2009] HKCFI 94. 
26 At [56].  
27 2016 ONSC 171.  
28 Penny J at [50].  
29 [2017] VSC 97.  
30 At [42]. See also O’Leary v Ryan [2015] IEHC 820 (in which it was alleged, inter alia, that the tribunal had 
failed or refused to consider and/or take into account a point of defence pleaded by the applicant).  
  
‘real complaint is that they consider that the tribunal reached the wrong result’,31 as long as 
the supervisory court focuses on the fairness of the procedure rather than the correctness 
of the decision, failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues can legitimately be 
characterised as a procedural error which, in an appropriate case, may justify setting aside 
or remission of the award. A failure by the tribunal to deal at all with an important issue 
involves a grave departure from the dispute-resolution process to which the parties 
committed themselves and cannot simply be equated with an error of substance, the risk of 
which parties have to be prepared to accept.  
  
[b] Art 34.2.a.iii (excess of jurisdiction) 
Article 34.2.a.iii of the Model Law provides that an award may be set aside if it ‘deals with a 
dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, 
or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.’ 
Although this provision is drafted in terms of awards that are ultra petita (in the sense that 
they go beyond the submission to arbitration), some commentators argue that it should be 
interpreted to cover also awards which are infra petita. Perhaps the leading proponent of 
this view is Gary Born, who suggests that ‘[t]he better view … is that awards should 
generally be subject to annulment on infra petita grounds, including when (as in Model Law 
jurisdictions) arbitration legislation contains no express provision to that effect.’32 Born’s 
argument is that: 
an arbitral tribunal’s failure to consider issues presented to it in fact amounts to an 
excess of authority, even if it appears only to be the reverse, because it effectively 
rewrites the tribunal’s mandate, which is an act beyond the arbitrators’ competence; 
that is particularly true when a tribunal fails to consider defenses or counterclaims 
related to relief that it does grant.33 
 
This view has been influential in Singapore, for example. In CRW Joint Operation v PT 
Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK,34 the Singapore Court of Appeal accepted that article 
34.2.a.iii is engaged not only in situations where an arbitral tribunal improperly decides 
matters that were not submitted to it but also in those where the tribunal fails to decide 
                                                          
31 Flaux J in Primera Maritime (Hellas) Ltd v Jiangsu Eastern Heavy Industry Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 3066 (Comm) 
at [6]. 
32 International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014) p 3294. 
33 Ibid. See also Paulsson, The 1958 New York Convention in Action (2016) p 188. 
34 [2011] SGCA 33. 
  
matters that had been submitted to it.35 This interpretation is, however, controversial – it 
flies in the face of the wording of the provision in question – and there seems to be no 
reported case in which an infra petita award has ultimately been set aside or remitted on 
the basis of article 34.2.a.iii.36 While opinion on whether an award which fails to resolve all 
of the issues raised in an arbitration may be set aside under article 34.2.a.iii remains 
divided, the text of article 34.2.a.iii is more consistent with the view that it deals solely with 
the problem of awards which are ultra petita.37  
 
[c] Art 34.2.a.ii (due process) 
Article 34.2.a.ii of the Model Law enables the supervisory court to set aside an award if the 
applicant ‘was unable to present his case.’ Most of the cases concerning this provision have 
involved the question whether the tribunal’s conduct of the arbitration had the effect of 
restricting the applicant’s room for manoeuvre in some way (for example, by giving the 
parties limited notice of hearings on certain issues or by deciding a dispute on a basis not 
raised or contemplated by the parties or by limiting the length of hearings during which 
parties could develop their arguments). It has been suggested, however, that there are two 
dimensions to the ability to present a case: a party’s opportunity to ‘speak’ and the 
tribunal’s obligation to ‘listen’. As Penny J said in Consolidated Contractors Group SAL v 
Abatovy Minerals SA,38a Canadian case:  
A party might be said to have been ‘unable’ to present his or her case when … the 
tribunal ignored or failed to take the evidence or submissions of the parties into 
account.39  
 
Nevertheless, the situation where the tribunal fails to decide matters that were put to it 
does not obviously fall within the wording of article 34.2.a.ii. Although there are instances in 
                                                          
35 See VK Rajah JA at [31]. See also TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 
SGHC 186; BLB v BLC [2013] SGHC 196.  
36 The first instance decision in BLB v BLC [2013] SGHC 196 (discussed by Tan & Ahmad, 'The UNCITRAL Model 
Law and Awards infra petita' (2014) 31 J Int Arb 413) was reversed on appeal in BLC v BLB [2014] SGCA 40.  
37 This view is also supported by authorities relating to art V.1.c, the equivalent provision of the NYC: van den 
Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 (1981) p 318; Port, Bowers et al, ‘Article V(1)(c)’ in Kronke, 
Nacimiento et al (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the 
New York Convention (2010) p 277.  
38 2016 ONSC 7171. 
39 At [57]. 
  
which an arbitral omission has been held to engage article 34.2.a.ii,40 such cases may be 
regarded as unorthodox. A more orthodox interpretation of the phrase ‘unable to present 
his case’ was adopted in Depo Traffic v Vikeda,41 which involved an application to enforce a 
Chinese award in Ontario.42 The award debtor (‘V’) had argued that, because it had been 
unable to present part of its defence, the award should not be enforced. According to V, the 
tribunal had ‘failed to render legal or factual findings on a submission fundamental to its 
defence’43 and had ‘failed to consider, in a meaningful and substantive way, the defence put 
forward by [V]’;44 this failure, so the argument went, amounted to denying V the ability to 
present its case. The Ontario judge was not persuaded. According to Chiappetta J, if V’s 
argument were accepted, the court would have to treat article 34.2.a.ii/ 36.1.a.ii as 
including words ‘that are simply not there’.45  
 
[d] Art 34.2.b.ii (public policy) 
Article 34.2.b.ii of the Model Law allows for the setting aside of an award if it conflicts with 
the public policy of the forum. There is international consensus that, for the purposes of the 
New York Convention (‘NYC’) and the Model Law, public policy is a narrow concept which is 
engaged only if an award is ‘contrary to the fundamental conceptions of morality and 
justice’ of the forum46 or if upholding the arbitral award ‘would “shock the conscience” … or 
[would be] “clearly injurious to the public good or … wholly offensive to the ordinary 
reasonable and fully informed member of the public”’.47 In a legislative framework which 
makes no provision for appeals on the merits and contains limited grounds on which an 
award may be set aside, it is almost inevitable that there will be pressure for the courts to 
expand the scope of public policy to accommodate cases in which it appears that the 
                                                          
40 Under German law, for example, it is not sufficient that the arbitral tribunal merely heard the arguments 
presented by the parties and took note of the evidence offered by them; it must also take them into account in 
the arbitral award: UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (‘UNCITRAL Digest’) p 150, para 74 (available at: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/MAL-
digest-2012-e.pdf). 
41 [2015] ONSC 999.  
42 Although the case concerned art 36.1.a.ii, the question of interpretation was, in substance, identical to that 
under art 34.2.a.ii.  
43 At [36].  
44 At [38].  
45 At [39].  
46 Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Société Général de Industrie du Papier (Rakta) (1974) 508 F 2d 
969 at 974.  
47 Chan Sek Keong CJ in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2006] SGCA 41 at [59] (citations 
omitted). 
  
arbitration has gone wrong in some fundamental way, but the complaint does not obviously 
fall within any of the other grounds for setting aside. 
 
It is widely assumed that the principles of natural justice are part of public policy; the twin 
pillars of natural justice – audi alteram partem (the ‘hearing’ rule) and nemo judex in causa 
sua (the ‘bias’ rule) – may legitimately be regarded as fundamental in a public policy 
sense.48 But, is the ‘hearing’ rule breached if an arbitral tribunal fails to decide an issue that 
was put to it? As already seen in the discussion of article 34.2.a.ii, it has been argued that 
the ‘hearing’ rule includes a sub-rule that the tribunal must ‘listen’ to the parties. This line of 
argument has been accepted, in principle, by courts in Australia.49 Similarly, in the seminal 
case of Front Row Investment Holdings (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Daimler South East Asia Pte 
Ltd,50 the Singapore High Court decided that there may be a breach of natural justice if the 
tribunal fails to consider material arguments or submissions of one of the parties. This view 
was based on the idea that a party’s right to be heard also includes the rule that an arbitral 
tribunal cannot disregard submissions or arguments without considering them on their 
merits.51  
 
There is also similar authority from Hong Kong. In A v B52 an application to set aside an 
award was based on the allegation that the award had failed to deal with the applicant’s 
‘limitation defence’ – that the claims advanced in the arbitration were time-barred under 
the express provisions of the agreement that gave rise to the dispute between the parties. 
Mimmie Chan J acknowledged that, ‘[a]t first blush, it may appear that [the applicant] can 
                                                          
48 In Singapore law, there is a separate rule which provides for an award to be set aside if ‘a breach of the rules 
of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced’: International Arbitration Act, s 24(b). There is a similar rule in the Australian International 
Arbitration Act 1974, which implements the NYC: an award may be refused enforcement if ‘to enforce the 
award would be contrary to public policy’ (s 8(7)) and ‘the enforcement of a foreign award would be contrary 
to public policy if … a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the 
award’ (s 8(7A)(b)).  
49 See, eg, Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd [2010] NSWSC 887; Aircraft Support 
Industries Pty Ltd v William Hare UAE LLC [2015] NSWCA 229 (a case involving enforcement of an award 
rendered in an arbitration seated in the UAE). In neither of these cases, however, did the argument succeed on 
the facts.  
50 [2010] SGHC 80. 
51 See Vinodh Coomaraswamy J in AKM v AKN [2014] SGHC 148 at [95]. 
52 [2015] HKCFI 1077.  
  
only establish that the Arbitrator has made an error of law or on the facts.’53 However, the 
judge stressed that it was ‘fundamental to concepts of fairness, due process and justice, as 
recognized in Hong Kong, that key and material issues raised for determination [by an 
arbitral tribunal] should be considered and dealt with fairly.’54 Failure by the tribunal to 
address an essential issue was a denial of due process which engaged the public policy of 
Hong Kong and justified the setting aside of the award under article 34.2.b.ii.  
 
Although Mimmie Chan J referred to the relevant authorities and purported to apply the 
narrow definition of public policy endorsed by such authorities,55 whether a failure by an 
arbitral tribunal to deal with an issue can be regarded as ‘contrary to the fundamental 
conceptions of morality and justice’ of the forum might be questioned. For example, in BLB 
v BLC56 Belinda Ang Saw Ean J doubted whether public policy could justify the setting aside 
of an award on the basis that the tribunal had failed to deal with all the issues put to it. In 
Depo Traffic v Vikeda,57 V had also sought to rely on public policy as a basis for non-
enforcement of the award. V had argued that the tribunal’s failure to consider, explore, or 
evaluate its case amounted to a denial of natural justice and that, as a result, recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of Ontario. Chiapetta J 
rejected the argument, stressing the exceptional nature of the public policy defence.58  
 
The opposite position has been taken in Australia, however. In TCL Air Conditioner 
(Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd,59 the court undertook a detailed 
examination of the historical relationship between natural justice and public policy (as that 
concept is understood under the NYC and the Model Law). The judgment of the court 
concluded that: 
The rules of natural justice can … be seen to fall within the conception of a 
fundamental principle of justice (that is within the conception of public policy), 
being, as they are, equated with, and based on, the notion of fairness. …Fairness 
                                                          
53 At [29]. 
54 At [33].  
55 See, eg, the authorities cited in nn 46 and 47.  
56 [2013] SGHC 196 at [100]. 
57 [2015] ONSC 999.  
58 It should be noted, however, that V’s argument failed at the first hurdle: the judge considered that the 
tribunal had been alive to V’s submissions and that it had referred to the issue (which V claimed had been 
overlooked) in its award.  
59 [2014] FCAFC 83. 
  
incorporates the underlying requirement of equality of treatment of the parties. 
…The conceptions of fairness and equality … lie at the heart of the constitutional 
conception of due process. They are inhering elements of law and justice that inform 
and bind any legal system and any legal order.60  
 
The court emphasised that, when deciding whether the rules of natural justice have been 
breached, the court’s task is not to embark upon the ‘formal application of rules 
disembodied from context, or taken from another statutory or human context’; an award 
which results from a process that (allegedly) breached the rules of natural justice is not 
contrary to public policy ‘unless fundamental norms of justice and fairness are breached.’61 
When the principles of natural justice are seen in this light, any objection to their 
characterisation as an element of public policy for the purposes of article 34.2.b.ii/36.1.b.ii 
seems misplaced.  
 
[e] Art 34.2.a.iv (incorrect procedure) 
In the context of international commercial arbitration, arbitrators are, as a general rule, 
required to provide reasons for their decision. If the parties agree to ad hoc arbitration (with 
its seat in a Model Law country), the applicable procedural rule is provided by article 31.2 of 
the Model Law, according to which ‘[t]he award shall state the reasons upon which it is 
based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given …’. If the parties have 
agreed to institutional arbitration, the institutional rules will usually include the same rule.62 
Although the tribunal does not have to provide reasons for accepting or rejecting every 
argument or piece of evidence presented in the arbitration,63 if the award does not address 
the important legal and factual issues raised by the parties, the tribunal has not complied 
with its obligation to provide reasons for its decision. Assuming that the obligation to give 
reasons was not excluded by the parties, a tribunal which fails to give adequate reasons for 
its decision commits a procedural irregularity. In such circumstances, may the award be 
challenged under article 34.2.a.iv of the Model Law – which provides that an award may be 
                                                          
60 At [73].  
61 At [111].  
62 See art 43.2 CIETAC Arbitration Rules; 31.2 ICC Arbitration Rules; art 34.4 HKIAC Administered Arbitration 
Rules; art 26.2 LCIA Arbitration Rules; art 5.2.e SIAC Arbitration Rules. See also art 34.3 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.  
63 TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 186 at [72]. See also 
Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v King [2017] SGHC 36. 
  
set aside if ‘the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties 
… or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law’? 
 
The answer to this question depends, in part, on what is meant by ‘arbitral procedure’. In 
terms of the Model Law, there is a clear distinction between ‘Conduct of Arbitral 
Proceedings’ (Chapter V) and ‘Making of Award and Termination of Proceedings’ (Chapter 
VI), which includes (in article 31.2) the tribunal’s obligation to provide reasons for its 
decision. If the ‘arbitral procedure’ involves only those matters covered by Chapter V (and 
not matters within Chapter VI), failure by the tribunal to provide reasons cannot be a 
ground for setting aside on the basis of article 34.2.a.iv. 
 
Be that as it may, it seems generally to be assumed by commentators that an award which 
does not include (adequate) reasons may be set aside either on the basis of public policy64 
or under article 34.2.a.iv65 and there are cases under the Model Law which proceed on the 
basis that article 34.2.a.iv is engaged if an award, in terms of reasoning, falls short of the 
requirements of article 31.2.66 As already seen, in A v B67 the applicant challenged an award 
for having failed either to deal with the applicant’s ‘limitation defence’ or to offer any 
reasons for this omission. Having analysed the award and the way in which the arbitration 
had been argued, the judge concluded that, in terms of the reasons, the award was 
defective. Mimmie Chan J rightly pointed out that ‘[a]n award should be reasoned, to the 
extent of being reasonably sufficient and understandable by the parties’68 and considered 
that the reasons expressed in the award were not sufficient to enable the applicant to 
understand how, and why, the limitation defence had been rejected. Although the award 
was set aside on public policy grounds, the judge seems to have accepted that, as an 
alternative, the award might have been set aside under article 34.2.a.iv.  
 
If the court accepts that failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were 
presented to it is a procedural defect which may justify setting aside on the basis of one (or 
                                                          
64 Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (2012) para 16.9.1.  
65 Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014) p 3274.  
66 See, eg, Hoban v Coughlan [2017] IEHC 301.  
67 [2015] HKCFI 1077. 
68 At [33]. 
  
more) of the provisions of article 34, the following question remains: what exactly does the 
applicant have to establish in order for the application to succeed? It is to this question that 
the discussion now turns.  
 
IV The requirements for a successful application under section 68(2)(d) AA96 and under 
article 34 of the Model Law 
When a setting-aside application is based on the tribunal’s failure to decide an issue 
presented in the arbitration, the AA96 establishes a framework of five significant questions 
which the court needs to answer: the first is whether the matter with which the tribunal 
(allegedly) failed to deal was an ‘issue’ [a]; if so, was that issue ‘put to’ the tribunal? [b]; if 
so, did the tribunal fail to deal with it? [c]; if so, did (or will) the applicant suffer substantial 
injustice as a result? [d]; if so, is the appropriate remedy setting aside or remission? [e].69 
The fact that section 68(2)(d) requires the court to address a series of specific questions 
results from the detailed drafting of the AA96’s setting-aside provisions. In Model Law 
jurisdictions, however, the courts are confronted by more general and abstract questions – 
such as whether the applicant was able to present his case, whether there had been a 
breach of the rules of natural justice or whether the award is contrary to the public policy of 
the forum – rather than a detailed legislative schema. Nevertheless, if an award may be set 
aside on the basis that the tribunal failed to deal with all the issues, the supervisory court 
has to decide what exactly, in the particular context, natural justice or public policy requires. 
As will be seen, there are parts of the English framework which are bound to be replicated 
in the context of applications under article 34 of the Model Law: for example, the 
requirements that the (allegedly) omitted issue had been put to the tribunal and that the 
tribunal had failed to deal with it (ie, questions [b] and [c] of the English framework) are, 
logically, a necessary part of any regime that allows for annulment on the basis of the 
tribunal’s failure to deal with all the issues.  
 
                                                          
69 An application for setting aside based on s 68(2)(d) may fall at any of these hurdles: the decided cases 
suggest that the success rate of applications under s 68(2)(d) is very low (certainly, less than 10%; probably less 
than 5%). In other jurisdictions, the success rate of setting aside applications on the basis that an award is 
ultra/infra petita is also very low. The statistical data from Switzerland suggest a success rate of around 3%: 
Dasser & Wójtowicz, 'Challenges of Swiss Arbitral Awards – Updated and Extended Statistical Data as of 2015' 
(2016) 34 ASA Bulletin 280, 286.  
  
This section examines how the questions that arise under section 68(2)(d) are addressed by 
the English courts and also considers the extent to which the same questions are regarded 
as relevant in the context of setting-aside applications under the Model Law and the extent 
to which, if at all, the courts of Model Law jurisdictions have been influenced by or have 
drawn on English authorities. At a general level, there is some evidence that the position 
under English law has had an impact on the thinking of judges in Model Law jurisdictions. 
For example, in A v B70 the judge’s conclusion that failure by the tribunal to deal with the 
applicant’s limitation defence involved a breach of natural justice and, as a result, infringed 
Hong Kong’s public policy was, partly, justified by the fact that such a failure provides a basis 
for setting aside under the AA96. Mimmie Chan J, having been referred to cases such as 
Ascot Commodities NV v Olam International Ltd,71 Van der Giessen-de Noord Shipbuilding 
Division BV v Imtech Marine and Offshore BV72 and Soeximex SAS v Agrocorp International 
Pte Ltd,73 ‘agree[d] with the sentiments expressed by the court [in those cases] that it is a 
serious irregularity and a denial of due process … if an important issue, which the parties are 
entitled to expect to be addressed, is not in fact addressed.’74 Notwithstanding the 
differences between the legislative frameworks in England and Hong Kong, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that an arbitral defect which falls within section 68(2)(d) may also 
provide a reason for setting aside under one of the more general provisions of article 34.  
 
[a] What is an ‘issue’ for the purposes of section 68(2)(d)? 
One English judge has described trying to define what is an ‘issue’ as an ‘impossible task’;75 
another has suggested, somewhat unhelpfully, that whether a matter is an issue ‘should 
normally be obvious’.76 In terms of the structure of the AA96, failure to deal with an ‘issue’ 
(to which section 68(2)(d) refers) is to be distinguished from failure to deal with a ‘claim’ 
(section 57(3)(b)). In Torch Offshore LLC v Cable Shipping Inc,77 Cooke J described an issue as 
‘part of a claim’ and considered that a claim is ‘a head of claim for damages or some other 
remedy’, whereas ‘an issue … is part of the process by which a decision is arrived at on one 
                                                          
70 [2015] HKCFI 1077 
71 [2002] CLC 277. 
72 [2008] EWHC 2904 (Comm).  
73 [2011] EWHC 2743 (Comm). 
74 [2015] HKCFI 1077 at [33].  
75 Andrew Smith J in Petrochemical Industries Co v Dow Chemical [2012] EWHC 2739 (Comm) at [17].  
76 Morison J in Fidelity Management SA v Myriad International Holdings BV [2012] EWHC 1193 (Comm) at [9].  
77 [2004] EWHC 787 (Comm). 
  
of th[e] claims’.78 Within this typology, the determination of a single ‘claim’ will require the 
tribunal to resolve a range of ‘issues’, which make up C’s claim and R’s defence.  
 
The courts have sought to distinguish ‘issues’, on the one hand, from ‘arguments’ advanced 
or ‘points’ made or ‘lines of reasoning’ or ‘steps’ in an argument,79 on the other, while also 
recognising that ‘[i]t can be difficult to decide quite where the line demarking issues from 
arguments falls.’80 There are several decisions which refer to ‘issues’ as being important, 
fundamental, essential, crucial or key.81 However, these adjectives are best not understood 
as a gloss on the language of section 68(2)(d).82 Whether a matter is an ‘issue’ primarily 
turns on whether determination of the matter in question was necessary for a decision on 
the claims or defences presented to the tribunal.83  
 
Where, for example, a respondent defends a claim for breach of contract on two 
independent bases, it may be that the arguments for one of the defences are very weak and 
those for the other defence are much more persuasive. Nevertheless, both defences are, in 
principle, ‘issues’, regardless of the strength or weakness of the arguments involved.84 If the 
tribunal rejects the claimant’s claim on the basis of one of the defences, failure by the 
tribunal to decide on the other defence does not engage section 68(2)(d): nothing turns on 
whether the second defence is accepted or rejected and failure by the tribunal to deal with 
the second defence cannot cause or have caused substantial injustice to either party.  
 
                                                          
78 At [27]. 
79 See Petrochemical Industries Co v Dow Chemical [2012] EWHC 2739 (Comm) at [16]; Hussmann (Europe) Ltd 
v Al Ameen Development & Trade Co [2000] CLC 1243, 1260-1.  
80 Andrew Smith J in Petrochemical Industries Co v Dow Chemical [2012] EWHC 2739 (Comm) at [21]; Akenhead 
J in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC) at [33]. See 
also Judge Kealey QC in Buyuk Camlica Shipping Trading & Industry Co Inc v Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 442 (Comm) at [44] (there is a ‘fine line sometimes between an issue, on the one hand, and a line of 
reasoning, on the other’). 
81 See, eg, Fidelity Management SA v Myriad International Holdings BV [2012] EWHC 1193 (Comm) at [10]; 
Abuja International Hotels Ltd v Meridien sas [2012] EWHC 87 (Comm) at [51]; Ascot Commodities NV v 
Olam International Ltd [2002] CLC 277, 284; PT Transportasi Gas Indonesia v ConocoPhillips (Grissik) Ltd 
[2016] EWHC 2834 (Comm) at [58].  
82 Petrochemical Industries Co (KSC) v Dow Chemical Co [2012] EWHC 2739 (Comm) at [16]. 
83 Weldon Plan Ltd v Commission for the New Towns [2001] 1 All ER 264 at [21]; World Trade Corporation v C 
Czarnikow Sugar Ltd [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm) at [16]; Abuja International Hotels Ltd v Meridien sas [2012] 
EWHC 87 (Comm) at [51].  
84 Judge Kealey QC in Buyuk Camlica Inc v Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd [2010] EWHC442 (Comm) at [38].  
  
An ‘issue’ – such as whether a contract was frustrated – may include sub-questions or sub-
issues – such as whether contractual performance had been rendered illegal or whether the 
(allegedly) frustrating event was foreseeable or had been self-induced – which are also 
themselves ‘issues’ within section 68(2)(d).85 This point is illustrated by Soeximex SAS v 
Agrocorp International Pte Ltd,86 which involved disputes arising out of a contract for the 
sale of a cargo of Burmese rice. A question arose as to whether the buyers’ failure to open a 
letter of credit was a breach of the contract; the buyers’ defence was that opening the letter 
of credit would have infringed US and/or EU regulations banning trade with Burma and 
would, therefore, have been illegal. The buyers argued the illegality point on two alternative 
bases: (i) payment was to be made to Burmese recipients; (ii) in any event, the US 
regulations prohibited the export of financial services to Burma (regardless of the 
nationality of the recipients of any funds). The buyers also offered a completely separate 
argument under the EU regulations. The tribunal decided that illegality had not been 
established because it was not satisfied that the recipients under the letter of credit would 
be Burmese. The award made no mention of the alternative arguments under the US and 
EU regulations – neither of which involved establishing that the recipients of the funds 
would be Burmese. In terms of section 68(2)(d), the situation might have been analysed in 
one of two ways. First, the ‘issue’ was illegality and the three arguments which the buyers 
raised were just that – arguments or lines or reasoning. According to this analysis, section 
68(2)(d) would not be engaged. Secondly, even though the question of illegality was clearly 
an ‘issue’ under section 68(2)(d), the three arguments raised by the buyers were also to be 
regarded as ‘issues’ (or ‘sub-issues’). According to this analysis, although the tribunal dealt 
with the Burmese recipients defence (in the claimant’s favour), it had not addressed the 
other two defences and, therefore, had failed to deal with all the issues that were put to it. 
Gloster J adopted the second analysis: each limb of the buyers’ defence was a separate 
‘issue’;87 the fact that the tribunal failed to address two of the buyers’ three contentions 
was a serious irregularity within section 68(2)(d). 
 
                                                          
85 Andrew Smith J in Petrochemical Industries Co (KSC) v Dow Chemical Co [2012] EWHC 2739 (Comm) at [16].  
86 [2011] EWHC 2743 (Comm). 
87 See also Transition Feeds LLP v Itochu Europe plc [2013] EWHC 3629 (Comm).  
  
In terms of fundamental principle, the setting-aside procedure does not provide the 
supervisory court with an opportunity to re-visit the factual determinations of the arbitral 
tribunal. As Flaux J pointed out in Sonatrach v Statoil Natural Gas LLC, ‘the evaluation of the 
evidence is entirely a matter for the tribunal.’88 Whether the tribunal accorded to any 
particular evidence more weight or less weight or no weight at all is not an ‘issue’ within the 
meaning of section 68(2)(d); how the tribunal evaluates the evidence is merely part of the 
process whereby an issue is resolved.89  
 
In Ispat Industries Ltd v Western Bulk Pte Ltd,90 ship-owners (‘C’) claimed damages from 
charterers (‘R’) for breach of a time charter. One of the disputed questions was whether C 
had acted reasonably in mitigating its loss. The majority of the arbitrators decided that there 
had been no unreasonable failure to mitigate and awarded damages equal to the hire 
payable for the estimated duration of the charterparty. Although one of the arbitrators (‘D’) 
dissented because he considered that the evidence of W, one of the witnesses on the 
question of mitigation, was unreliable, the majority had accepted W’s evidence. The award 
had neither addressed D’s concerns over the reliability of W’s evidence nor explained why 
W’s testimony was considered reliable. R sought to challenge the award under section 
68(2)(d) on the basis that the award had failed to deal with an ‘issue’ that had been put to it 
– namely, W’s reliability. The judge dismissed this challenge on the ground that any question 
surrounding W’s reliability, a question concerning the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence, 
was not an ‘issue’ for the purposes of section 68(2)(d).  
 
It is also clear that ‘fail[ure] to take into account evidence or a document said to be relevant 
to [an] issue is not properly to be regarded as a failure to deal with an issue.’91 Time and 
time again the English courts have re-iterated that ‘it is not permissible on a section 68 
application to seek to argue that the arbitrator has not dealt with a particular piece of 
evidence.’92  
                                                          
88 [2014] EWHC 875 (Comm) at [12]. See also Claire & Co Ltd v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2005] EWHC 1022 
(TCC). 
89 See Colman J in World Trade Corp Ltd v C Czarnikow Sugar Ltd [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm) at [31].  
90 [2011] EWHC 93 (Comm). 
91 Colman J in World Trade Corporation v C Czarnikow Sugar Ltd [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm) at [45]. 
92 Akenhead J in The Celtic Explorer [2015] EWHC 1810 (Comm) at [41]. See also Schwebel v Schwebel [2010] 
EWHC 3280 (TCC). Disappointed parties have attempted to rely on s 68(2)(a) AA96 to have awards set aside on 
  
 
By the same token, under English law, failure by the tribunal to provide reasons for its 
decision does not amount to failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues for the 
purposes of section 68(2)(d). In Hussman (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen Development & Trade Co 
Thomas J said: 
  a tribunal [is not required] to set out each step by which they reach their conclusion 
or deal with each point made by a party in an arbitration. Any failure by the 
arbitrators in that respect is not a failure to deal with an issue that was put to it. It 
may amount to a criticism of the reasoning, but it is no more than that.93 
 
In the same vein, Morison J confirmed in Fidelity Management SA v Myriad International 
Holdings BV that ‘there is a difference between a failure to deal with an issue … and a failure 
to provide any or any sufficient reasons for the decision.’94 
 
As has been seen in Section III, applications of the type which fall within section 68(2)(d) 
AA96 are most likely, under the Model Law, to be viewed through the prism of due process, 
natural justice or public policy. The legislative scheme of the Model Law, unlike section 
68(2)(d), does not require the supervisory court to determine the nature of the omission 
alleged by the applicant.  
 
Nevertheless, the English case law has had an influence on the analysis of the courts of 
Model Law jurisdictions. This influence is, perhaps, most clearly seen in TMM Division 
Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd,95 a decision of the Singapore High 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the basis that, by overlooking significant evidence, the tribunal failed in its obligation to treat the parties 
equally; in Arduina Holdings BV v Celtic Resources Holdings plc [2006] EWHC 3155 (Comm) Toulson J (at [46]) 
accepted (obiter) that an arbitrator’s failure to take any or proper consideration of the evidence could, in an 
exceptional case, give rise to a challenge under s 68(2)(a). However, there appears to be no reported case in 
which an award has been set aside or remitted on this basis and the correctness of Toulson J’s dictum may be 
questioned. 
93 [2000] CLC 1243, 1261. 
94 [2012] EWHC 1193 (Comm) at [10]; see also Margulead Ltd v Exide Technologies [2004] EWHC 1019 (Comm) 
at [46]. The fact that failure to provide adequate reasons does not engage s 68(2)(d) does not mean that such 
failures are legally irrelevant: (i) under s 57(3)(a) AA96, a party may apply to the tribunal to ‘remove any 
ambiguity in the award’, which may require the provision of further reasons or clarification of the reasoning 
(see Torch Offshore LLC v Cable Shipping Inc [2004] EWHC 787 (Comm)); (ii) in the context of a setting-aside 
application, the court may order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in sufficient detail so that the 
court is able to consider the application (s 70(4) AA96); (iii) an award may be set aside for ‘failure to comply 
with the requirements as to the form of the award’ (s 68(2)(h) AA96); ‘requirements as to form’ include 
reasons for the tribunal’s decision.  
95 [2013] SGHC 186.  
  
Court. The application to set aside the award was based on two grounds: first, the applicant 
argued that the tribunal had breached the rules of natural justice; secondly, relying on 
article 34.2.a.iii of the Model Law, the applicant argued that the tribunal had exceeded its 
authority. Under the head of natural justice, the applicant argued, inter alia, that the 
arbitrator had disregarded and ignored the applicant’s submissions and/or had not fully 
explained the reasons for his conclusions and/or had not applied his mind fully to the issues 
before him. 
 
When dealing with these assertions, Chan Seng Onn J asked himself whether natural justice 
requires an arbitral tribunal to address all the arguments canvassed and evidence presented 
and to explain why it accepted or rejected each argument. Having considered cases such as 
Ascot Commodities NV v Olam International Ltd96 and Hussman (Europe) Ltd v Al Ameen 
Development and Trade Co,97 the judge decided that ‘[a]n arbitral tribunal is not obliged to 
deal with every argument’ and ‘need not deal with each point made by a party in an 
arbitration’; rather, echoing the position adopted by the English courts under section 
68(2(d), the judge considered that the tribunal needs only ‘to ensure that the essential 
issues are dealt with.’98 If the principles of natural justice cannot be breached unless a 
tribunal ‘fail[s] to consider an important issue that has been pleaded in an arbitration’,99 the 
outer limits of the scope of the court’s setting-aside jurisdiction in Model Law jurisdictions 
are essentially the same as those of the English courts under section 68(2)(d) AA96. 
 
[b] Was the issue ‘put to’ the tribunal? 
Cases arise in which it is alleged that the tribunal failed to deal with an issue which, after the 
event, the applicant wishes it had raised in the arbitration. If the issue in question had not 
been submitted to the tribunal, the tribunal cannot legitimately be criticised for not having 
dealt with it and section 68(2)(d) AA96 is not engaged.100 It is the tribunal’s role to address 
the cases that the parties advanced, not the cases that they might (or should) have 
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advanced. It has been emphasised (in the context of the Model Law) that the setting aside 
process ‘is not to be abused by a party who, with the benefit of hindsight, wished he had 
pleaded or presented his case in a different way before the arbitrator.’101  
 
In the recent English case of A v B,102 for example, the applicant argued that, in the context 
of a dispute relating to the alleged breach of a contract for the sale of goods, the tribunal 
had failed to decide what were the express and implied terms of the contract and, in 
particular, whether, by virtue of section 14(2B)(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the goods 
supplied should have been regarded as of unsatisfactory quality because they were unfit for 
all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied. 
 
Judge Butcher QC rejected the argument: first, the potential impact of section 14(2B)(a) was 
an argument, rather than a fundamental issue;103 second, even if the point relating to 
section 14(2B)(a) had been an ‘issue’, it had not been ‘put to’ the tribunal. The judge noted 
that there had been ‘minor and incidental arguments’ relating to section 14(2B)(a), but that 
the applicant had not attempted to present any evidence which would have backed up 
reliance on that section. An issue is not ‘put to’ the tribunal for the purposes of section 
68(2)(d) simply because it is mentioned (in passing) at some point of the arbitration: it is not 
‘a serious irregularity for a tribunal to fail to deal with a point which was put before them, if 
at all, only unclearly and indistinctly.’104 Accordingly, in A v B, the fact that the award did not 
address section 14(2B)(a) was not an omission which could found a claim under section 
68(2)(d) AA96.  
 
Not surprisingly, the cases decided under the Model Law are equally insistent that, if it is 
alleged that the tribunal breached natural justice by failing to deal with an issue, that issue 
must have been presented to the tribunal for decision. As Phang JA observed in BLC v BLB:  
It is important not to underestimate the ingenuity of counsel who seek to launch 
backdoor appeals or, worse still, completely reinvent their client’s cases with the 
benefit of hindsight in the guise of a challenge based on an alleged breach of natural 
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justice. … The courts must be wary of a party who accuses an arbitrator of failing to 
consider and deal with an issue that was never before him in the first place.105 
 
When deciding whether a particular issue was presented in the arbitration, the court will 
ask whether the tribunal failed to respond to a ‘clearly articulated argument’.106 As the 
tribunal does not have ‘to deal with mere assertions which are unsupported by 
argument’,107 if an argument was not clearly articulated, the tribunal‘s not having 
considered it cannot be a breach of the rules of natural justice.108 In this respect, the case 
law under the Model Law adopts the same approach as the English authorities – without 
actually referring to or explicitly relying on them.  
 
[c] Was the issue dealt with by the tribunal? 
By far and away the most common reason for the rejection of applications based on section 
68(2)(d) is that the tribunal did deal with the issue which the applicant alleges was omitted 
from the award. It is well established that the supervisory court should not read the 
challenged award with an overcritical eye; nit-picking is the wrong approach; an arbitral 
award should not be read like a statute, but should be approached in a reasonable and 
commercial way; the judge should not analyse an award with a meticulous legal eye, 
endeavouring to pick holes, inconsistencies and faults in it; the court’s expectation should 
be that it will not, normally, be possible to find substantial fault with an award that is 
subject to challenge.109 In the context of applications under section 68(2)(d), when an award 
is approached in the appropriate way, it is normally clear that the tribunal did decide the 
allegedly omitted issue – albeit not in the way that the applicant had hoped.110 
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Section 68(2)(d) is not applicable unless the tribunal did not deal with an issue at all;111 it 
does not matter for the purposes of section 68(2)(d) whether the tribunal dealt with it well, 
badly or indifferently.112 In The Celtic Explorer,113 for example, the applicant sought to 
challenge an award on the basis that the award, by addressing a point raised by the 
applicant only briefly, had not dealt with the issue. As the judge explained, the applicant’s 
‘real complaint’ was that the arbitrator’s reasoning on the point in question was not ‘fuller 
and better expressed’.114 The judge considered that it was likely that the arbitrator had 
dealt with the point shortly because it did not merit more discussion; the point had been 
advanced by the applicant’s counsel with no evidence from his own expert to support it and 
the point had been contradicted by the claimant’s expert, whose evidence the arbitrator 
had preferred anyway. In such circumstances, it was ‘scarcely surprising that the arbitrator 
had given it pretty short shrift.’115 
 
A tribunal which decides all the issues that were essential in order for it to come to its 
decision on the claims and defences raised in the arbitration has dealt with all the issues for 
the purposes of section 68(2)(d).116 The fact that the tribunal may have failed to deal with a 
non-essential matter is not relevant.117 Not every essential issue needs to be explicitly 
decided: by expressly dealing with some issues, the tribunal may also impliedly deal with 
others.118 Moreover, some of the issues raised by the parties may not require decision by 
the tribunal: by deciding some issues in a certain way, the tribunal may render other issues 
irrelevant.119 For example, a tribunal that rejects a claim because the respondent has no 
liability does not fall foul of section 68(2)(d) if it does not come to a conclusion on each issue 
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(or any issue) about quantum: by its decision on liability, the tribunal disposes of (or ‘deals 
with’) the quantum issues.120 
 
The approach of the English courts is also reflected in the case law decided under the Model 
Law. There are four points that are particularly worthy of note. 
 
First, following English cases such as Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd121 
and Atkins Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport,122 the Singapore courts have also decided 
that, in the context of a setting-aside application, the supervisory court should read the 
award in a reasonable and commercial way, avoiding nit-picking and an excessively semantic 
analysis of the text of the award.123  
 
Secondly, an applicant can succeed on the basis that the tribunal’s failure to deal with an 
issue involved a breach of the principles of natural justice only by establishing a clear and 
virtually inescapable inference – which will be drawn only in exceptional circumstances – 
that the arbitrator did not apply his mind at all to a particular aspect of the applicant’s 
submissions;124 such an inference will not be drawn if the award is consistent with the 
arbitrator simply having misunderstood the applicant’s case or having been mistaken as to 
the law or having chosen not to deal with a point because he (mistakenly) thought it 
unnecessary to do so.125 In this regard, it is important to keep in mind the distinction 
between a tribunal’s decision to reject an argument (whether implicitly or otherwise, 
whether rightly or wrongly), on the one hand, and a tribunal’s failure even to consider that 
argument, on the other.126 Only the latter can possibly amount to a breach of the principles 
of natural justice.   
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The Singapore courts have held that it is not a breach of natural justice for a tribunal to 
decline to express a view on an issue which its chain of reasoning renders irrelevant.127 The 
approach adopted under the Model Law – which echoes that of the English cases decided 
under section 68(2)(d)128 – means that an applicant will rarely be able to satisfy the court 
that the tribunal breached natural justice by failing to deal with an issue. More often than 
not, in cases where it is alleged that, by not applying its mind to, or engaging with, the 
applicant’s actual case, the tribunal committed a breach of natural justice, no such breach 
occurred.129 Normally, the supervisory court ends up rejecting the challenge on the basis 
that, on the facts, the tribunal did deal – whether expressly or by implication130 – with the 
matter which the applicant claims to have been overlooked. But, if the tribunal mistakenly 
thought that the applicant had conceded a point and, as a consequence, failed to engage 
with an argument which might have had a bearing on the outcome of the arbitration, the 
tribunal has not complied with the principles of natural justice and the award may be set 
aside.131  
 
Thirdly, there are cases under the Model Law which support the view that the tribunal does 
not have deal expressly with every issue. A tribunal can be said to have dealt with an issue if 
that issue is ‘implicitly resolved’.132  
 
Fourthly, cases under the Model Law have also decided that the tribunal does not have to 
address issues which, although superficially important, are rendered irrelevant or ‘of 
academic interest only’;133 if, for example, the tribunal’s primary finding is that the 
claimant’s claim for breach of contract is inadmissible, the tribunal is not required to 
address whether or not the respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of the terms of the 
contract or whether the damages claimed by the claimant were too remote.  
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 [d] Did (or will) the tribunal’s failure to deal with an issue cause ‘substantial injustice’?  
As already seen, section 68(2) requires that the serious irregularity has caused or will cause 
‘substantial injustice’, a requirement that involves the supervisory court in examining, at 
least to some extent, the merits of the dispute referred to arbitration. The applicant does 
not have to satisfy the court that, but for the irregularity, the substantive decision would 
have been different; the applicant does not even have to show that it had the better of the 
argument on the omitted issue. The requirement of substantial injustice will be met if the 
supervisory court is satisfied that the omitted issue was arguable and that, had the tribunal 
considered it, the tribunal ‘might well have reached another conclusion favourable to the 
applicant’.134 This means that a setting-aside application will necessarily fail if, even had the 
irregularity not occurred, the outcome of the arbitration would have been the same.135 
 
In Buyuk Camlica Shipping Trading & Industry Co Inc v Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd,136  for 
example, disputes arising under charterparties had been referred to arbitration. One of the 
claims was for damages for breach of the description warranties in each of the 
charterparties. In response, the respondent argued that, if there had been a breach of the 
warranties, the breach had been waived by the claimant. The arbitral tribunal decided in the 
claimant’s favour, but failed to refer to the respondent’s argument on waiver. Although the 
question whether the claimant had waived the breach was an ‘issue’ which had been ‘put 
to’ the tribunal and which the tribunal had failed to ‘deal with’, the conditions of section 
68(2) had not been satisfied. In the judge’s view, it was not reasonably arguable that the 
claimant had waived the breach of the description warranties; as a result, the tribunal’s 
failure to deal with the issue had not caused substantial injustice.  
 
The opposite conclusion was reached, however, in Van der Giessen-de-Noord Shipbuilding 
Division BV v Imtech Marine & Offshore BV,137 which involved an arbitration arising out of a 
contract to carry out the engineering, supply, installation and commissioning of the 
electrical equipment for a ro-ro ferry. With regard to one of the claims, the respondent had 
contended before the arbitral tribunal that the claimant had waived its right to claim certain 
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monies and/or was estopped from doing so. Nevertheless, the tribunal upheld the claim and 
did not deal with the respondent’s waiver/estoppel defence. Christopher Clarke J held, inter 
alia, that this failure amounted to a serious irregularity within section 68(2)(d). 
 
Ascot Commodities NV v Olam International Ltd138 also treated the tribunal’s failure to 
address part of the respondent’s defence as a serious irregularity. The arbitration had 
involved a claim for damages for breach of a contract for the sale of a cargo of rice. The 
respondent admitted the breach and the dispute centred on the question of damages. The 
tribunal awarded damages on the basis that the claimant had been the beneficial owner of 
the cargo in question. The award made no mention of the respondent’s argument that the 
relevant bills of lading had been pledged to the claimant, rather than transferred outright. In 
the context of the respondent’s setting-aside application, the claimant contended that the 
respondent’s real complaint was simply that its arguments had not been accepted by the 
tribunal and that, as a result, there was no irregularity for the purposes of section 68. 
Toulson J, however, considered that there had been a procedural defect within section 
68(2)(d): this was not a case in which the tribunal had ‘directed itself to, and rejected, the 
central issue argued by [the respondent]’; rather, the tribunal had ‘missed’ the ‘central 
point’139 (that, as the relevant bills of lading had been pledged as security, damages should 
not have been assessed on the basis that the claimant had been the beneficial owner of the 
cargo). 
 
Although the Model Law simply provides that an award ‘may be’ set aside if one of the 
grounds set out in article 34 is satisfied and has no equivalent to the requirement of 
‘substantial injustice’ imposed by section 68(2) AA96, the difference between the AA96 and 
the Model Law on this point exists more at the level of form than substance. There seems to 
be a broad consensus that an irregularity which does not cause prejudice to the applicant 
does not justify setting aside under article 34.140 Within the decisions under the Model Law, 
there are two main categories of case. On the one hand, some decisions treat real prejudice 
as an essential requirement which an applicant for setting aside under article 34 needs to 
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establish. This approach is illustrated by the strand in the Singapore case law which, in 
substance, follows the approach taken by section 68(2) AA96. In CRW Joint Operation v PT 
Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK, the Court of Appeal, building on its earlier decision in 
Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd,141 ruled that an irregularity 
should not lead to setting aside unless it had caused ‘real or actual prejudice’.142 As for what 
constitutes ‘real or actual prejudice’, an approach very similar to that adopted in Vee 
Networks Ltd v Econet Wireless International Ltd143 is followed: the test is whether the 
arbitral tribunal could reasonably have arrived at a different result if not for the 
irregularity.144  
 
On the other hand, other cases proceed on the basis that the question of prejudice is a 
discretionary factor to be taken into account by the court when deciding whether or not to 
set aside. The Hong Kong courts, for example, have rejected the notion that English law’s 
requirement that the alleged defect has caused or will cause substantial injustice can be 
imported into the Model Law,145 but have accepted – perhaps most significantly in Grand 
Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd146 – that, as a general rule,147 if the applicant 
is unable to show that it had been or might have been prejudiced, the flexibility conferred 
by the phrase ‘may be set aside’ in article 34.2 allows the court not to set aside an award 
even though a ground for setting aside is established. In practice, in a case involving no 
prejudice, it makes little difference whether a setting-aside application fails because the 
supervisory court decides that no ground for setting aside is established or because, 
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although a ground for setting aside is established, the court exercises its discretion against 
setting aside: in each situation, the application is rejected for essentially the same reason – 
namely, that the applicant failed to show substantial injustice or prejudice.148 
 
[e] Setting aside or remission? 
If the requirements of section 68(2)(d) AA96 are satisfied, setting aside is only one of the 
remedies available to the court; remission is an alternative to setting aside. Under the AA96, 
section 68(3) makes it clear that setting aside should be seen as a remedy of last resort: ‘The 
court shall not exercise its power to set aside … unless it is satisfied that it would be 
inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.’  
 
In practical terms, there seems little point in the court setting aside an award if it would be 
possible for the tribunal to make good the omission which gave rise to the setting-aside 
application in the first place. In this type of case, it makes more sense for the court to remit 
the dispute to the tribunal to allow it to address the issues which the award failed to 
resolve.149 The authorities show that, under the AA96, in a case in which the tribunal’s 
award fails to deal with an issue, remission is the remedy that might normally be 
expected.150 The language of section 68(3) (‘remit the matters in question to the tribunal for 
reconsideration’) is strongly indicative that, if the supervisory court opts for remission, the 
award is sent back to the original tribunal, rather than a new one. That is to say, the choice 
facing the court is between setting aside the award (thereby enabling the dispute to be 
decided afresh by a newly constituted tribunal151) or referring it back to the original tribunal.  
 
Although the effect of section 68(3) AA96 is to make remission the usual remedy in cases of 
arbitral omission, remission is not always appropriate. The court has to consider not only all 
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the circumstances and background facts relating to the dispute, the award and the 
arbitrators, but also the ramifications, in terms of costs, time and justice, of setting aside 
and remission.152 Ultimately, the court has to be satisfied that the tribunal can be trusted to 
(and be seen to) deliver justice for the parties if the award is remitted.153 The more serious 
the irregularity, the less likely that remission will be the proper remedy. Remission is not 
appropriate if, for example, the parties have lost confidence in the tribunal,154 or the whole 
arbitration will have to be re-opened and re-argued,155 or the effect of the passage of time 
between the rendering of the award and the disposition of the setting-aside application is 
such that the tribunal no longer has a clear or reliable recollection of exactly how things 
were argued.156 In such cases, a fresh start is needed and the award should be set aside. 
 
Remission is also an alternative to setting aside under article 34.4 of the Model Law, 
although that provision is not drafted in the language of remit/remission. In a case in which 
the tribunal’s failure to deal with an issue involves a breach of the rules of natural justice, 
remission is the remedy that might be expected under the Model Law (at least in those 
Model Law jurisdictions whose legal system is derived from the English legal system).157 
There is, however, a significant difference between section 68 AA96 and article 34.4. 
Whereas the English legislation gives the supervisory court a choice in terms of remedies, 
the Model Law provides that setting aside proceedings may be suspended only if the court 
thinks it appropriate to do so and the applicant makes such a request. If the applicant does 
not seek remission, the supervisory court’s choice is between upholding the award or 
setting it aside.  
 
Article 34.4, which talks about the arbitral tribunal been given ‘an opportunity to resume 
the arbitral proceedings’, indicates that, if the supervisory court opts for remission, the 
award is sent back to the original tribunal. In the Singapore case of BLB v BLC158 the High 
Court judge had thought that, where a ground for setting aside had been established, the 
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award could be remitted to a new tribunal. However, the Court of Appeal decided, albeit 
obiter, that ‘the clear language of Art 34.4 does not … permit the remission of the award 
(without more) to a newly constituted tribunal.’159  
 
V Conclusion  
Under both the AA96 and the Model Law, an award which fails to address an essential issue 
which had been presented to the tribunal may be set aside or remitted. However, the 
different structures of the two pieces of legislation produce different judicial analyses. The 
analysis under the AA96 is relatively simple because section 68(2(d) expressly identifies 
failure to deal with an issue as an irregularity. The absence of an equivalent provision in the 
Model Law leaves the courts of Model Law jurisdictions on less solid ground. As has been 
seen in Section III, some uncertainty exists over whether the tribunal’s failure to deal with 
an issue is a ground for setting aside under article 34 and, if so, which statutory rule 
provides the legal basis for setting aside in such cases.  
 
It is ‘a basic rule of comparative law’ that ‘different legal systems  give the same or very 
similar solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life’160  – even though they may 
well reach these common solutions by quite different routes.161 As regards the question 
whether an arbitral award should be set aside or remitted if the tribunal failed to deal with 
an issue, it has been seen that the data are consistent with the ‘basic rule of comparative 
law’: in practice, the AA96 and the Model Law – though drafted differently – largely run 
along parallel lines. 
 
The courts of Model Law jurisdictions, in the absence of a provision equivalent to section 
68(2)(d) AA96, have been willing to entertain applications for the setting aside of awards in 
cases of alleged arbitral omission. Although the courts of different Model Law jurisdictions 
have considered different provisions of article 34 of the Model Law as the basis for such 
applications, the most plausible one is article 34.2.b.ii. According to this rule, an award may 
be set aside if it conflicts with the public policy of the forum and, as shown by the Federal 
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Court of Australia’s analysis of the relationship between natural justice and public policy in 
TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd,162 public policy for the 
purposes of article 34.2.b.ii must be regarded as including the rules of natural justice.  
 
As has been seen in Section IV, the courts of Model Law jurisdictions have adopted a similar 
schema to the framework of questions arising under section 68(2)(d) AA96. Both the AA96 
and the Model Law require that an applicant establish not only that the award failed to 
address at all an essential issue which had been clearly presented to the tribunal but also 
that such failure caused substantial injustice (or real prejudice) to the applicant. If the 
applicant overcomes these hurdles the court will, as a general rule, remit the award to the 
tribunal, though, in exceptional cases, the award (or part of it) may be set aside. In the main, 
both legislative regimes arrive at very similar conclusions.  
 
If, in terms of substance, the two regimes are broadly equivalent, any meaningful 
assessment of them can be made only at the level of legal technique. Not surprisingly, 
opinions differ on the respective strengths and weaknesses of the AA96 and the Model Law. 
As regards setting aside, the main strengths of the Model Law scheme are its apparent 
simplicity and the fact that the grounds for setting aside mirror those in article V NYC, 
thereby enabling cross-fertilisation of case law under the two instruments and increased 
opportunities for international harmonisation. However, as the foregoing discussion reveals, 
the apparent simplicity of the Model Law may be tested even by a relatively routine 
scenario. As seen, how challenges based on a tribunal’s failure to deal with all the issues 
should be analysed under the Model Law is not entirely straightforward.  
 
Although international uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Model Law is 
desirable, the discussion in Section III identifies various points at which there are 
divergences between the laws of Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and Canada. Uniformity in 
interpretation is very hard to achieve in the context of legislative provisions whose 
operation depends on open-textured concepts such as due process, natural justice or public 
policy, the significance of which may well differ from one legal system to another. Of course, 
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it does not follow from the foregoing comparison that the approach of the AA96 is to be 
preferred to that of the Model Law; indeed, section 68(2)(d) is not without its own 
problems. But, it needs to be recognised that legislation which appears simple on the page 
may prove to be less simple in practice.  
 
Finally, it is clear that applications for the setting aside of an award because the tribunal 
failed to deal with an issue that was put to it present particular challenges for any modern 
system of arbitration law. It is indisputable that, as a general rule, the tribunal is exclusively 
competent to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute, both in terms of law and fact. 
However, as noted by the courts in cases decided under both the AA96 and the Model Law, 
many setting aside applications are thinly-disguised attacks on the tribunals’ decisions on 
the merits.163 In such cases, the supervisory court has the difficult task of ‘sieving out the 
genuine challenges from those which are effectively appeals on the merits’.164 
 
One reason why the courts’ task is so tricky is that applications under section 68(2)(d) AA96 
(and analogous applications under the Model Law) are located right at the cusp between 
the merits, on the one hand, and the arbitral procedure, on the other. An applicant, 
convinced of the rightness of its position and the persuasiveness of its arguments, can easily 
fall into the trap of thinking that the only reason that could explain the fact that it was not 
more successful in the arbitration is that the tribunal must have failed to consider and/or 
understand its case. Unless the courts are careful, an application for setting aside on the 
basis that the tribunal failed to deal with an issue may easily morph into a re-hearing of the 
substance of the dispute. This problem is graphically illustrated, in the context of the Model 
Law, by TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd,165 in which, at 
the first instance hearing, the parties spent three days arguing about, essentially, the 
                                                          
163 See, eg, Langley J in Protech Project Construction (Pty Ltd v Mohammed Abdulmohsin [2005] EWHC 2164 
(Comm) at [34] (‘[the applicant’s] case seeks to dress up as an irregularity what is in reality a question of law’); 
Teare J in UMS Holding Ltd v Great Station Properties SA [2017] EWHC 2398 (Comm) at [143] (‘[a]s has often 
been said an application pursuant to section 68 should not be used to disguise what are in truth challenges to 
the Tribunal’s findings of fact’). 
164 Chan Seng Onn J in TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 186 at 
[2].  
165 [2014] FCAFC 83. 
  
tribunal’s findings of fact;166 the application ‘was a disguised attack on the factual findings of 
the arbitrators dressed up as a complaint about natural justice.’167 In the words of the 
appellate court:  
Applications [for setting aside] should not be permitted to be used (or hijacked) to 
undertake, in substance, a rehearing of factual or legal reasoning under the guise of 
a complaint about a breach of the rules of natural justice.168 
 
The cases decided under the AA96 reveal similar concerns and problems. In Weldon Plant 
Ltd v The Commission for New Towns,169 Judge Lloyd QC emphasised that ‘[s]ection 68(2)(d) 
is not to be used as a means of launching a detailed enquiry into the manner in which the 
tribunal considered the various issues.’170 Notwithstanding this warning, in London 
Underground Ltd v Citylink Telecommunications Ltd,171 the judgment – which runs to more 
than sixty pages, nearly fifty of which are devoted to the section 68 application – undertakes 
an exhaustive discussion of the parties’ pleadings, evidence and submissions and involves 
detailed analysis of the lengthy award. Such a process is hardly consistent with the tribunal’s 
decision-making autonomy. Furthermore, many cases involve misconceived or 
inappropriate challenges. Unsurprisingly, judges sometimes find it difficult to hide their 
frustration at the antics and tactics of applicants, describing grounds of challenge as 
‘untenable’,172 ‘a hopeless point’173 or ‘far-fetched and insupportable’.174  
Even though the focus of a setting-aside application is the fairness of the arbitral process, 
rather than the correctness of the tribunal’s decision, it is difficult to see how, in the context 
of an application to set aside an award on the basis that the tribunal failed to deal with an 
issue, the court can avoid becoming embroiled, at some level, in a re-assessment of the 
substance of the parties’ dispute. When considering, for example, whether the issue which 
the tribunal allegedly failed to deal with had been put to the tribunal, the court is drawn 
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into an analysis of how the parties presented their respective cases. And within a framework 
which requires the applicant to establish that the irregularity caused substantial injustice or 
real or actual prejudice, the supervisory court has little choice but to consider what the 
decision might have been had the tribunal considered the issue in question (without actually 
deciding what the outcome of the arbitration should have been). A setting-aside regime that 
requires the supervisory court to focus on the (sometimes narrow) dividing line between the 
merits and the process – in a context in which the applicant has every interest in 
encouraging the court to stray onto the wrong side of the line – runs the risk of generating 
unmeritorious applications where the applicant’s arguments are ‘little more than a 
confected attempt to run a merits challenge of the arbitral tribunal’s legal and factual 
analysis’.175 The autonomy of the arbitral process relies on the vigilance of the courts to 
prevent setting-aside applications becoming de facto appeals on the merits.   
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